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Barriers to Recovery in Pennsylvania

Third Party Beneficiary Law
I.

Introduction

Third party beneficiary law' in Pennsylvania abounds with confusion that results from inconsistent interpretations and restrictive judicial
doctrines. In 1927 Professor Arthur Corbin noted this disorder when he
described the law of Pennsylvania as being so inconsistent that no lawyer
could safely advise his client without first taking his case to the supreme
court. 2 This confusion originated in Blymire v. Boistle, 3 the state's
leading beneficiary case, which flatly denounced the rights of creditor
beneficiaries. Although the supreme court now explicitly acknowledges
that creditor beneficiaries possess enforceable rights, 4 it will be shown
that the law continues to adhere to Blymire's archiac rule. Moreover, in
recent years the supreme court has aggravated the confusion by adopting
vague restrictive doctrines that in most instances have resulted in a broad
denial of recovery to all third party beneficiaries. So today, fifty years
later, Professor Corbin's description unfortunately continues to reflect the
state of the law.
The purpose of this comment is to examine two general problem
areas that exist in Pennsylvania third party beneficiary law. First, the
courts' lack of clarity in analysis and failure to recognize the distinctions
between donee and creditor beneficiaries will be considered. Second, the
rationale and validity of recent judicial limitations will be analyzed. The
objective of the comment is to suggest a means out of the confusing
morass of case law.
II.

Beneficiaries--General Rules

A.

Creation of ContractualRights in Beneficiaries
Third party beneficiary law encompasses the situation in which a
third person seeks to enforce a contract to which he is not a party-. The
1.

For general background on third party beneficiaries, see 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS

§ 772-855 (1961); J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS § 276-288 (Rev. ed. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-147 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-147 (1932); 2 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 33 347-403 (3d ed. 1959).

2. Corbin, The Law of Third PartyBeneficiaries in Pennsylvania, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1928); see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS-PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS (1933). The introduction to chapter six of the latter aptly begins, "The law of Pennsylvania is very much
confused on this topic."
3. 6 Watts 182 (Pa. 1837); see Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in
Pennsylvania, supra note 2 (Corbin in this article calls for the express overruling of
Blymire).
4. See note 41 and accompanying text infra.

action by the third party is based on the general proposition that two
5
contracting parties have the power to create rights in a third person.
Beneficiary rights are neither dependent on privity of contract 6 nor on
furnishing any part of the consideration. 7 To be sure, however, no rights
8
can arise in favor of any party unless a valid contract exists.
The prevailing view generally follows the original Restatement of
9
Contracts and grants donee and creditor beneficiaries enforceable rights.
The basic test of intended beneficiaries is whether the promisee desires
that the third person receive something of value from performance of a
contract. 10 This test can also be stated from the beneficiaries' perspective:
Was the third person reasonable in believing that he was to derive a
benefit or right from the contract?" l All others who may in some way be
benefitted indirectly or as a consequence of the performance have no
rights and are called incidental beneficiaries. '2 Sometimes this distinction
between intended and incidental beneficiaries is drawn on the basis of
public policy. 13 The burden, of course, would be too onerous on the
5. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see United States v. Thomas B. Bourne
Assoc., 367 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Commonwealth v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 312 Pa.
183, 167 A. 793 (1933).
6. Massengale v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 385 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1967); Anderson v.
Rexroad, 175 Kan. 676, 266 P.2d 320 (1954); accord, Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78 (1879).
7. Beck v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1947); LaMourea v. Rhude,
209 Minn. 53, 295 N.W. 304 (1940); Burns v. Washington Sav., 251 Miss. 789, 171 So. 2d 322
(1965).
8.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 140 (1932). See Rose v. Rose, 385 Pa. 427, 123

A.2d 643 (1965); Williams v. Paxson Coal Co., 346 Pa. 468, 31 A.2d 69 (1943).
9. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), the leading case in American law that
set forth the broad general rules of law that have since spread throughout the country. See
also 4 CORBIN, supra note I, at § 774.
10. The terminology "intended beneficiary" includes all beneficiaries who have enforceable rights and explicitly encompasses the categories of donee and creditor beneficiaries as defined by the original Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133-136
(1932). It should be noted that the second Restatement has abandoned the specific terminology of creditor and donee beneficiary and has adopted the general inclusive term "intended
beneficiary." Underlying this change was the belief that the terms carried "overtones of
obsolete doctrinal difficulties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note,
Chapter Six (1973). Since the new Restatement retains the two now nameless classifications
(§ 133(l)(a) states the creditor beneficiary rule and § 133(1)(b) states the donee rule), the
terminology of the original Restatement is emloyed throughout this comment for the purpose of increased clarity. Also, American law generally classifies persons who have enforceable rights under contracts to which they are not parties as either creditor or donee
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495 (3d
Cir. 1953); Martinex v. Socoma Cos., Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 585, 521 P.2d 841 (1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, Comments b and c (1973).
II. This is the view taken by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133,

Comment d (1973). This perspective was adopted to gain more objectivity in analyzing
cases.
12. lsbrandtsen Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953);
Willard v. Claborn, 220 Tenn. 501, 419 S.W.2d 168 (1967); McDonald Constr. Co. v.
Murray, 5 Wash. App. 68, 485 P.2d 626 (1971); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(c) (1932).

See also 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 719c, at 40. Professor Corbin notes that this definition is
not particularly helpful "for the problem of the courts is to determine what kinds of
claimants asserting themselves to be beneficiaries have rights and what kinds have not."
13. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495, 498 (3d Cir.
1953), in which the court denied relief because the plaintiff was "too far away from this
contract to be included either as a donee or a creditor beneficiary." See also Thompson v.

promisor if all individuals who received some indirect benefit from
contractual performance were given enforceable rights.
B.

Kinds of Intended Beneficiaries

1. The Donee Beneficiary.- A third person is a donee beneficiary
when it appears that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise
of all or part of the performance is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to
confer upon him a right against the promisor. 4 The relationship between
the promisee and the beneficiary can be described as that of donor-donee
and the performance received by the beneficiary is most often in the
nature of a gift. 15 Donee beneficiaries are given enforceable rights against
the promisor because the "party to the contract would have no action for
its breach except for nominal damages since he was not the one who
suffered by the promisor's default."1 6 Also, the donee beneficiary does
not have a right of action against the promisee because the latter owes no
contractual obligation to the beneficiary. The courts for these reasons
protect "the interest of the person for whose benefit theperformance was
intended to prevent a failure of justice." 7
2. The CreditorBeneficiary.-A creditor-beneficiary relationship
exists if the performance of the promisor's promise will satisfy an actual,
supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary and is not
intended as a gift. 8 When the promisee owes a prior obligation, the
Harry C. Erb, Inc., 240 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1957) (noting that the policy against imposing large
liability was not a consideration when liability was the result of voluntary business choice);
Keefer v. Lombardi, 376 Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1954) (holding that, if sureties are liable to
laborers and materialmen in the event of default, members of the public certainly do not
stand on any lower level of suable rights); Falsetti v. UMW Local 2026, 400 Pa. 145, 161
A.2d 882 (1960) (stating that as a matter of policy, individual employees cannot enforce a
union contract since it would create chaos). Contra, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Contracts,
Illustration 13 (1973); see Luzerne Anthracite, Inc. v. Borough of Kingston, 38 Luz. 229 (Pa.
C.P. 1945).
14. The prevailing view generally follows the donee rule as set forth in the original
Restatement. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(l)(a) (1932). The rule reads:
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than
the promisee, that person is, . . . (a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the
terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose
of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof
is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the
promisor to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due
from the promisee to the beneficiary.
In donee cases, intent of the promisee to benefit the third person is the primary test of
enforceability. See McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534 (D. Minn. 1943).
15.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(2) (1932). The comments to this section further

explain, "By gift is meant primarily some performance or right which is not paid for by the
recipient and which is apparently designed to benefit him." Id., Comment c. See note 18
infra, which explains the scope of the new Restatement.
16. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495, 497 (3d Cir. 1953),
accord, United States v. Thomas B. Bowrve Assoc., 367 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
17. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495, 496 (3d Cir. 1953).
It would be a failure of justice in the sense that the promisor could breach the contract and
avoid providing a remedy to either the promisee or donee beneficiary. See Commonwealth
v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 312 Pa. 183, 167 A. 793 (1933).
18. Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d

creditor beneficiary can bring action against either party for satisfaction
of the duty owed.19 Although creditor-beneficiary cases arise most frequently when one person contracts to pay the debt of another, the term
"creditor" may also properly be used broadly to include any obligee to
whom the promisee owes a duty.20 In creditor beneficiary cases, the
better reasoned opinions engage in a two-step inquiry by first examining
whether the promisee owes an obligation to the third person and then by
determining whether the promisor promised to discharge the obligation.2
C.

The Pennsylvania Variation

Although the prevailing view follows the Restatement of Contract
rules, Pennsylvania third party beneficiary law has developed along a
unique route. The donee rule of Pennsylvania begins with the basic
Restatement position, but then imposes limitations that limit recovery. 22
In creditor beneficiary cases no attempt is made to adhere to the Restate311 (1959); accord, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (1932). The full text of the
creditor rule of the Restatement reads:
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than
the promisee, that person is, . . . (b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make
a gift appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed
or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary
against the promisee which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a
discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of
Frauds.
The new Restatement narrows the scope of the creditor rule to circumstances in which
"performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133(l)(a) (1973). The official comment, however, states, "Promise of a performance other than the payment of money may be
governed by the same principle if the promisee's obligation is regarded as easily convertible
into money .......
Id. Comment b.
The reason for the change in scope was explained by the distinguished reporter Professor Robert Braucher as follows: "Where the promise is to pay a supposed or asserted debt,
. . . it's very doubtful whether that is properly described as a creditor beneficiary. It's a
noncreditor beneficiary." 44 ALl PROCEEDINGS 306 (1967). This group of "noncreditor
beneficiaries" is now included within an expanded definition of the former donee rule,
which grants the beneficiary enforceable rights when, "the circumstances indicate that the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133(l)(b) (1973). Since no change in substantive law
was intended and none has resulted, the former terms and scope of the original Restatement
are retained in this comment in accordance with their general use by the bench and bar.
19. 2 WILLISTON, supra note i, § 361; see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jardel Co., 421
F.2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1970); Hughes v. Gibbs, 55 Wash. 2d 791,350 P.2d 475 (1960). The right to
proceed against either party has created problems in some jurisdictions when it is feared that
the promisor "would be subject to two separate actions at the same time, for the same debt,
which would be inconvenient, and might lead to injustice." Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182,
184 (Pa. 1837); see Second Nat'l Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878); Fry v. Ausman,
29 S.D. 30, 135 N.W. 708 (1912). Nevertheless, the majority of courts now recognizes the
beneficiary's direct pecuniary interest in the performance of the contract and permits
enforcement against the promisor. Also, this argument has now lost validity because of the
liberal rules of interpleading in effect in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., FED.. R. Civ. P. 22.
20. Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d
311 (1959); 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 776.
21. Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 4% (3d Cir. 1962); Lawrence
v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St.
505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959).
22. See text at notes 90-127 infra.

ment rules. Instead, the courts apply doctrines that should be applicable
only in donee cases. 23 The remainder of this comment will analyze the
Pennsylvania variations and their retarding effect on beneficiary rights.
Two Barriers to Recovery in Pennsylvania
Many deserving beneficiaries have been denied recovery in Pennsylvania on the basis of unfounded reasons that can be divided into two
general areas. First, the rights of creditor beneficiaries are ignored because the courts apply donee rules to every third party beneficiary situation and thereby make it almost impossible for a true creditor beneficiary
to recover. Second, the supreme court in Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co. 24 formulated two additional roadblocks to recovery that perplex
all beneficiaries. The two additional requirements, as presented in
Spires, are that both parties to the contract, rather than only the promisee,
must intend to benefit the beneficiary and that the obligation in favor of
the beneficiary must affirmatively appear in the contract.
III.

A.

Failure to Distinguish Between Creditorand Donee Beneficiaries

1. HistoricalConsiderations:Lack of Clarity.-The historical development of third party beneficiary law in Pennsylvania provides insight
into the reason for the courts' failure to distinguish between creditor and
donee beneficiaries. The most obvious feature in this historical development has been an absence of clarity. The resulting massive confusion
has enabled the inequitable rules of the early cases 25 to retain their
validity to this day, even though these early cases are never cited as
precedent. Lack of clarity in the decisional law has, thus, disguised the
true rule of the state, as interpreted by the supreme court, that creditor
beneficiaries cannot recover.
In the leading Pennsylvania case on third party beneficiary law,
Blymire v. Boistle,26 it was suggested in dictum that a third person may
enforce a contract made for his benefit.27 Regrettably, however, the
court's holding was that a creditor beneficiary has no right of action
23. See text at notes 25-89 infra.
24. 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950).
25. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text infra. See also First Episcopal Church v.
Isenberg, 246 Pa. 221, 92 A.141 (1914); Sweeney v. Houston, 243 Pa. 542, 90 A. 347 (1914);
Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76, 13 A. 184 (1888). The courts held in creditor beneficiary cases
that the right of action was in the promisee alone. See Brill v. Brill, 282 Pa. 276, 127 A. 840
(1925). In Brill, the court held a creditor beneficiary to be a donee beneficiary. See generally
79 U. PA. L. REV. 350 (1928).
26. 6 Watts 182 (Pa. 1837) (land was conveyed by the promisee to the promisor in
exchange for a promise to pay a judgment and by the promisee to the plaintiff).
27. Id. at 184. The Blymire court stated the donee rule as follows: "Where one person
contracts with another to pay money to a third, or to deliver over some valuable thing, and
such third person is thus the only party in interest, he ought to possess the right to release
the demand or recover it by action." It is apparent that the rule of Blymire is very restrictive
compared to the Restatement rule of § 133(l)(a). See note 18 and accompanying text supra.

against the promisor. 28 According to Blymire, when a promisor assumes
an obligation owed by the promisee to a third person, the contract is
deemed to be for the benefit of the promisee. Therefore, the third party
has no right to recover on his contract. 2 9 It is this rationale that underlies
the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in all cases in which
creditor beneficiary rights are asserted.
The Blymire rule, with a few minor exceptions ,30 was followed
consistently for nearly a century. In 1932, however, a breakthrough in the
law of third party beneficiaries occurred with the apparent adoption of
section 133 of the Restatement of Contracts in Concrete Products v.
United States Fidelity & GuarantyCo. 31 The court, unwilling to classify
the plaintiff as either a donee or creditor beneficiary, 32 tried to circumvent
the Blymire rule by concluding that materialmen bringing suit on a surety
bond have "the status not of mere creditor beneficiaries but of direct
promisees." 33 Also, the court quoted approvingly from the Restatement
of Contractsrules for donee and creditor beneficiaries. The importance of
the decision rests on two points. First, the direct promisee reasoning
underlies the "Spires Rule" that the identity of the third party must
affirmatively appear in the contract. 34 Second, this was the only time the
28. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 278 (1859), discussed at note 9 supra, in which the
court permitted a creditor beneficiary to recover. The Blymire holding is thus in direct
conflict with the leading case followed by the majority view.
29. See Greene County v. Southern Sur. Co., 292 Pa. 304, 141 A. 27 (1927) (donee
case). The court articulated the rule as follows: "Under the general rule stated in [Blymire]
and followed for almost a century, where the contract is for the benefit of the promisee, or,
in other words where the third person is a creditor beneficiary, there can be no recovery."
Id. at 316, 141 A. at 31-32 (citation omitted).
30. A thorough treatment of the early exceptions to the creditor beneficiary rule is
provided by Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, supra note 2. See
also 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 828, in which the law of Pennsylvania is discussed. The
exceptions are based on a "transfer of assets" theory. Howes v. Scott, 224 Pa. 7, 73 A. 186
(1909). But see 2 WILLISTON, supra note I, § 349, stating that the transfer of property
exception is unwarranted because there is no connection between the assets handed over to
the promisor and the payment actually made to the third person. Under the "transfer of
assets" theory, whenever the assets pass into the hands of the promisor in exchange for a
promise to pay an obligation of the promisee, the third person is permitted to enforce the
contract.
Another exception, which first developed under the above rule and is now covered by
statute, is the express assumption of a mortgage debt by a grantee. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 655 (Purdon 1955). The mortgagee is permitted to sue as a creditor beneficiary in this
instance. See, e.g., Steinert v. Galasso, 363 Pa. 393, 69A.2d 841 (1949); Fair Oaks Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Kahler, 320 Pa. 245, 181 A. 779 (1935); Frey v. United Traction Co. v.
Pittsburgh, 320 Pa. 196, 181 A. 775 (1935). The cases recognizing this exception are not
based on the Restatement rule, but on case law and statutory interpretation. Although these
exceptions exist, they are relatively minor and are rarely, if ever, applied today.
31. 310 Pa. 158, 165 A. 492 (1932) (suit by materialmen on a public construction surety
bond). Actions on public construction bonds are now covered by statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, §§ 1291-97 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
32. For examples of similar unwillingness, see Demharter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 412 Pa. 142, 194 A.2d 214 (1963); Kreimer v. Second Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 196
Pa. Super. Ct. 644, 176 A.2d 132 (1961).
33. 310 Pa. 158, 163, 165 A. 492, 497 (1933).
34. This rule was the natural extension of the direct promisee analysis. See note 109
and accompanying text infra.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ever quoted the creditor beneficiary
rule of the Restatement.3 The donee rule of the Restatement quoted in
Concrete Products was soon to be applied by the courts as the ruling law.
The creditor rule, however, was doomed to obscurity.
The court quickly began to avoid the creditor beneficiary rule of the
Restatement as Commonwealth v. GreatAmerican Indemnity Co. 36 typifies. The court in GreatAmerican Indenmnity Co. incorporated section
133 of the Restatement of Contracts into its decision. Despite the adoption of this section, which includes both the creditor and donee rule, the
court quoted only the donee rule; the court did not formally recognize the
creditor rule. 37 While the applicability of section 133 has not been
expressly limited to any particular class of contracts, 38 a definitive ruling
on whether the creditor rule of the Restatement is the law remains
uncertain.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has never found a beneficiary
whom the justices consider worthy of recovery as a creditor beneficiary
under the Restatement rules. This is true despite the interpretation by
some courts that the Great American Indemnity Co. case adopted as law
both donee and creditor rules. 39 Yet, the supreme court in Burke v. North
Huntingdon Township Municipal Authority40 stated, "That a third party
not in privity to the original contract, may sue as a creditor beneficiary is
now the rule in Pennsylvania.' ,41 The irony of this assertion is evidenced
35. In the most recent case dealing with beneficiary rights in Pennsylvania, the
superior court quoted both the donee and creditor rules of the original Restatement.
Hillbrook Apts., Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co., 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 565, 352 A.2d 148 (1975). While
the supreme court has not followed the creditor rule of § 133(l)(b) of the Restatement, it has
been quick to quote the rule of incidental beneficiaries contained in § 133(l)(c). See, e.g.,
Burke v. North Huntington Tp. Mun. Auth., 390 Pa. 588, 136 A.2d 310 (1957).
36. 312 Pa. 183, 167 A. 793 (1933). The court also adopted sections 135, 139, and 345 of
the Restatement and noted that it was willingly joining the sister states.
37. See Frumkin v. Mayer, 139 Pa. Super. Ct. 139, 11 A.2d 767 (1939), which
construed a reference in Great American Indemnity Co. to creditor beneficiaries as an
adoption of the rule.
38. McClelland v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 322 Pa. 439, 185 A. 198 (1936); Philipsborn v. 17th & Chestnut Holding Corp., I I Pa. Super. Ct. 9, 169 A. 473 (1933); see Williams
v. Paxson Coal Co., 346 Pa. 468, 31 A.2d 69 (1943).
39. See, e.g., Ar-Tik Sys. Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 4% (3d Cir. 1962);
Mowrer v. Poirier & McLane Corp., 382 Pa. 2, 114 A.2d 88 (1955); Keefer v. Lombardi, 376
Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1954). In Keefer, Justice Musmanno wrote for a unanimous court as
follows:
Happily, Pennsylvania no longer stands outside the almost completely-sweeping
circle of states which permit third party intervention in certain contracts. The
turning point in our law on this subject came in the case of Commonwealth v.
Great Am. Indemnity Co., where we. . .adopted the applicable rules in Restatement, Contracts, (cf. Sections 133, 135, 139, 345) (citation omitted).
Id. at 372-73, 102 A.2d at 698. See also Williams v. Paxson Coal Co., 346 Pa. 468, 31 A.2d 69
(1943); Frumkin v. Mayer, 139 Pa. Super. Ct. 139, 11 A.2d 767 (1940); Dana Perfumes Corp.
v. Greater Wilkes-Barre Indus. Fund, Inc., 65 Luz. 141 (Pa. C.P. 1975); Frank v. Corace,
Inc. v. West Pa. Disposal Corp., 118 P.L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1970); Marietta Gravity Water Co.
v. John H. Swanger, Inc., 57 Lanc. 303 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Weiner v. Hospital Service Plan, 13
Pa. D. & C.2d 689 (C.P. Lehigh 1958); 12 U. PiTr. L. REV. 295 (1951).
40. 390 Pa. 588, 136 A.2d 310 (1957).
41. Id. at 595, 136 A.2d at 314 (citations omitted). The opinion reads on, "The
application of this Rule . . . depends on the intention of the parties to the contract ....

by the authority the Burke court cited in support of its statement. All of
the cases cited by the court as precedent were suits brought by either
donee or incidental beneficiaries, not creditor beneficiaries. 4 2 In essence,
the supreme court rule that creditor beneficiaries have enforceable rights
exists in name only.
The evolution of the creditor beneficiary case law has thus offered
little guidance to anyone concerned with its workings.43 The creditor rule
in Pennsylvania may in fact be the Restatement rule or it may still be
Blymire doctrine, since the supreme court has only permitted recovery in
very limited instances. The lack of clarity results from the courts' failure
to expressly overrule decisions no longer valid" and to clearly set forth
the rules on which they base their decisions. 4 5 This assumes, of course,
that some kind of legal principle rather than a purely ad hoc determination
underlies the decisional law. Moreover, because of this confusion, the
supreme court has filed to make fundamental analytical distinctions
between creditor and donee beneficiaries and has thereby done great harm
to the rights of creditor beneficiaries as will be seen in the following
section.
2. Misapplication of the "Intent to Benefit" Rule.--One of the
effects of the lack of clarity in the case law is a failure by the supreme
court to recognize the fundamental differences between donee and creditor beneficiaries. The court in analyzing cases that litigate beneficiaries'
rights has applied the donee test of "intent to benefit" to all beId. at 596, 136 A.2d at 314. The court thus indicated that this mere conclusion of law is the
framework
on which it based its decisions.
only 42.
The Burke
court cited the following cases as authority for the intent rule discussed
at note 41 supra: Mowrer v. Poirier & McLane Corp., 382 Pa. 2, 114 A.2d 88 (1955) (in
which the beneficiary was found to be incidental); Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa.
52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950) (incidental beneficiary case); Commonwealth v. Great Am. Indem.
Co., 312 Pa. 183, 167 A. 793 (1933) (donee was permitted to recover), and Concrete Prod.
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 310 Pa. 158, 165 A. 492 (1932) (donee beneficiary
case). The court also cited 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 828 as authority, but this very section
of the treatise criticizes the Pennsylvania courts for not giving creditor beneficiaries the
right to recover.
43. See Dana Perfumes Corp. v. Greater Wilkes-Barre Indus. Fund, Inc., 65 Luz. 141
(Pa. C.P. 1975) (illustrating the result of the lack of clarity in the law that probably led to
plaintiff's failure to plead his status as a third party beneficiary).
44. See Commonwealth v. Great Am. Indemn. Co., 312 Pa. 183, 167 A. 793 (1933)
(concurring opinion). This is the only time in the history of third party beneficiary law in
Pennsylvania that a prior case was forthrightly overruled. The reversal marked a departure
from the law that had evolved in surety bond cases since Greene County v. Southern Sur.
Co., 292 Pa. 304, 141 A. 27 (1927), in which recovery had been denied.
45. E.g., Frey v. United Traction Co., 320 Pa. 196, 181 A. 775 (1935). The promisor
assumed the obligation for bonds for which the plaintiff was the obligee. Although it
permitted suit on the contract, the court avoided citing the Restatement and did not
designate the plaintiff as either a donee or creditor beneficiary, nor did it provide any
indication of the basis of its decision. See also 82 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1934) (noting that
treatment by the courts leaves something to be desired in the way of clarity and completeness); Note, The Rights of Third PartyBeneficiaries in Pennsylvania, 13 TEMPLE L. REV. 118
(1938-39) (calling for the courts to take the final step and forthrightly adopt the Restatement
rules).

neficiaries. 46 It has failed to look beyond the donee rule to the operative
facts that should be determinative in creditor beneficiary cases. Thus, the
supreme court has overlooked the proper analysis for creditor cases: Did
the promisee owe an obligation to the third person and was the obligation
assumed by the promisor?47 The flaw that has resulted in Pennsylvania
law is aptly described by Professor Williston as follows: "Any attempt to '
reduce to a single governing principle the case of the donee beneficiary
and of the creditor beneficiary is not only doomed to failure but is an
inevitable source of confusion."'48
If it were properly utilized, the "intent to benefit" test would be an
operative consideration only in donee beneficiary cases. 49 By applying
the test to both donee and creditor beneficiaries the supreme court disregards the crucial distinctions enunciated by the treatise writers and the
Restatement.50 The "intent to benefit" test is applicable in donee cases
since the desire to benefit the third person is the promisee's main purpose
in entering the contract. In creditor beneficiary contracts, however, the
promisee's guiding purpose is not to confer a benefit on the third person,
but to obtain a discharge of his obligation owed to the third person. 5 The
promisee seeks to attain this end to benefit himself, not his creditors or
obligees. 52 Thus, the "intent to benefit" test has no viability in creditor
beneficiary cases and should play no role in the analysis.
Some explanation of the "intent to benefit" test is necessary to fully
understand its use in Pennsylvania. If the "intent to benefit" standard is
used in the sense of requiring that the promisee intends the promisor to
53
assume a direct obligation to the third person, it is not objectionable.
Certainly a beneficiary must be within the contemplation of the promisee
46. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 733 (1952). Professor Corbin notes that the
rules of donee and creditor beneficiaries should be distinguished and should not both be
based upon the indefinite phrase "intent to benefit."
47. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
48. 2 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 356A, at 839.
49. "In third party cases, the right of such party does not depend upon the purpose,
motive, or intent of the promisor." CORBIN, supra note 46, at 732. See Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Longshoremen's Local 1291, 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953).
50. See 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 776; 2 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 356A; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932). "[lt's the intention of the promisee that you are searching
for in the case where you are trying to see who intended that this benefit should go to the
beneficiary. The trouble is that it is not the intention of the promisor." 44 ALl PROCEEDINGS
311 (1967) (Professor Robert Braucher, reporter).
51. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jardel Co., 421 F.2d 1048, 1054 (3d Cir. 1970) (the court
noted the promisee's objective in creditor beneficiary cases is always to benefit himself).
See 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 776, at 10. Corbin illustrates the problems of the "intent to
benefit" test as follows: "[Suppose] B conveys Blackacre to A in return for A's promise to
pay $1,000 to A's dearly hated creditor C. . . . It is certain that intention to benefit cannot
be identified with love and affection. It is now a desire to escape from C's clutches that
motivates B and causes him to convey his land to A."
52. Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chi. & St. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d
311 (1959); McCulloch v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534 (D. Minn. 1943).
53. See McDonald Constr. Co. v. Murray, 5 Wash. App. 68, 485 P.2d 626(1971). The
court distinguished between intent to confer a benefit and intent that the promisor shall
assume a direct obligation.

before enforceable rights arise. When, however, the test is used in a
manner synonymous with the promisee's purpose or motive, and this
becomes the determinative factor, difficult analytical problems develop. 54
55
Unfortunately the Pennsylvania courts, since the days of Blymire,
have used the test in the latter manner. 56 Recovery is allowed only if the
promisee's motive or donative intent is to confer a gift or benefit upon the
third person. But, in creditor beneficiary cases the promisee's dominant
motive is to have the promisor discharge his obligation to the third party.
His intent is not to benefit anyone except himself. Consequently, the
courts of this state systematically find that the parties to a contract only
intended to benefit themselves;5 7 creditor beneficiaries are rarely recognized by the lower judicial tribunals and never by the supreme court.
Although this is a simple way to resolve a controversy, it conflicts with a
common sense interpretation.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applies this incomplete method
of analysis to creditor beneficiary cases by looking solely for an intention
of the parties to confer a benefit and no further. A case which illustrates
this point is Burke v. North Huntingdon Township Municipal Authority. 58 Under the terms of the contract in issue, the obligation owed to the
plaintiff-third party was expressly set forth, and provisions were made for
its payment. The court, however, reasoned that,
When the County Authority exacted from the Township and the
Township Authority a promise to pay reasonable fees and expense of the consulting engineers [the plaintiff] up to $20,000.00
54. See Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954) (discussion of
difference between motive and intent).
55. Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182 (1837 Pa.).
56. See, e.g., Burke v. North Huntington Tp. Mun. Auth., 390 Pa. 588, 597, 136 A.2d
310, 315 (1957). The court stated "Taking into consideration the circumstances under which
this contract was made and its terms it is obvious that the parties had no intent to confer a
benefit upon [the plaintiff]." Silverman v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 407 Pa. 507, 180 A.2d 894
(1962) (court found no motive to benefit a third person in a lease containing a promise by the
tenant to procure insurance); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 414 Pa.
91, 199 A.2d 272 (1964); Supan v. Oriole Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 638
(C.P. Alleg. 1965); Barnes v. Craft, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 731 (C.P. York 1961). In fact, the
Pennsylvania rule is even more restrictive as both the promisee and the promisor are
required to have an "intent to benefit" the third person. See footnotes 92-107 infra.
57. Van Cor, Inc. v. American Cas. Co., 417 Pa. 408, 208 A.2d 267 (1965); Steets v.
Sovereign Constr. Co., 413 Pa. 458, 198 A.2d 590 (1964); Mowrer v. Poirier & McLane
Corp., 382 Pa. 2, 114 A.2d 88 (1955); Holly Constructions Co. Inc. v. Pottsgrove School
Auth., 91 Montg. 199 (Pa. C.P. 1969); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Warfel Assoc.,
Inc., 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 695 (C.P. Lanc. 1955).
This point is illustrated by the situation in which a plaintiff sustained personal injuries in
a fall on land leased by the defendant. The lease contained a provision obligating the tenant
to indemnify the landlord for all liability arising from injury upon the premises. Also, the
tenant agreed to maintain and pay the costs of general liability insurance for both parties.
The decision of the court was that the parties only intended to benefit themselves by these
provisions and had no intent to benefit injured third parties. Silverman v. Food Fair Stores,
Inc., 407 Pa. 507, 180 A.2d 894 (1962). See Brief for Appellee, arguing only that the landlord
was intended to be benefited and that it would be patently absurd to hold the defendant
liable for thousands of patrons. Accord, George v. Brehm. 246 F. Supp. 242 (W.D. Pa.
1965). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133, Illustration 9 (1973).
58. 390 Pa. 588, 136 A.2d 310 (1957).

and when the Township exacted from the County Authority the
promise to pay engineering fees in excess of $20,000.00, did the
parties intend thereby to confer a benefit upon Burke [the
plaintiff]? 59
On the basis of this inquiry the court found the parties had "no intent to
confer a benefit upon Burke.' 60 The only semblance of a test or principle
adduced by the court reads, "on whether the third party is in fact a
creditor beneficiary, . . . depends on the intention of the parties to the

contract as expressed therein.''61 But conspicuously absent from this
conclusive statement are any guideposts on how the promisee's intention
must be manifested or what kind or degree of intention is required.
Avoiding these pertinent inquiries, the court concluded the plaintiff was
62
only an incidental beneficiary and not a protected creditor beneficiary.
If the Burke court would have recognized the fundamental distinctions between donee and creditor beneficiaries, its analytical perspective
would have been entirely different. 63 The creditor rule requires only a
showing that the performance of the promise will satisfy an actual,
asserted, or supposed duty of the promisee to the beneficiary. 64 The court
in Burke found an obligation that was owed by the seller-promisee and a
promise to pay the obligation by the County Authority-promisor. 65 The
court, however, did not appreciate the importance of these crucial factors
as the analysis ended when it found no "intent to benefit." By applying
the donee "intent to benefit" analysis, the court failed to adopt the simple
creditor test of whether the promisee owed a duty to the third party that
was assumed by the promisor. In essence, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has never found a creditor beneficiary because it has never applied
the proper creditor beneficiary test and the donee rule has constituted an
insurmountable barrier.
Once the court acknowledges the distinction between donee and
creditor beneficiaries, a crucial element in applying the creditor test will
be whether the promisee owed an obligation. The scope of inquiry
necessary to determine whether the promisee owed an obligation to a third
party includes analysis of both duties and liabilities.' Accordingly, the
59. Id.at 597, 136 A.2d at 315.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 596, 136 A.2d at 314.
62. The court did refer to the incidental beneficiary rule of the Restatement, but made
no reference to the creditor rule, even though this was the issue of the case.
63. The court was aware of the Restatement rule, as both the appellee and appellant
raised it in their briefs. See Brief for Appellant at 12-18; Brief for Appellee at 2-16.
64. Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy Queen Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 133(l)(b)(1932). See also 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 776, at 8 (Supp. 1971).
He observes that "a creditor beneficiary does not have to prove that the contracting parties
'intended' to confer a 'benefit' on him as if they regarded him as a donee."
65. See 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 828, at 116 (Supp. 1971). In discussing Burke,
Professor Corbin says, "But even the very terms of the express contract itself show that all
the parties expressly contemplated Burke's claim and made express promises that it should
be discharged. That is the only "intent to benefit" that is required to be shown by a creditor
beneficiary."
66. See W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 5 (Cook ed. 1923).

scope has not been restricted to situations in which the promisee owed a
liquidated debt.6 7 A duty barred by a statute of limitations or rendered

unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds also should be within the inquiry. 68 The term obligation thus should be construed to encompass
duties and liabilities arising both under contract and law. Furthermore,
Professor Corbin's suggested guideline is that the term "may properly be
used broadly to include any obligee to whom the promisee owes a
duty.' '69
A good illustration of the principle's application can be found in Van
Cor, Inc. v. American Casualty Co. ,70 in which the supreme court was
faced with the question whether a "cooperation clause" in a construction
contract created a creditor beneficiary relationship. The "cooperation
clause" required each contractor to be responsible for any actions that
interfered with the progress of the other contractors' work. The plaintiffcontractor argued that the owner-promisee owed an obligation to provide
a site at which the work could be performed without hindrance or delay
and that by the "cooperation clause" the subcontractor promised to fulfill
this obligation. 7
The court demonstrated its reluctance to tackle the beneficiary question by affirming per curiam and quoting exerpts from the opinion of the
lower court. Again the inquiry ended after the court applied the donee test
of "intent to benefit" without reaching the appropriate creditor inquiries.
Also, the opinion ignored the leading case on this point, Visintine & Co.
v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad,72 which held that a
"cooperation clause" results in the promisor's assumption of a duty
owed by the promisee to another, a duty created by contract. The duty to
provide a suitable work site in Van Cor should thus have been sufficient
to give the plaintiff the status of a creditor beneficiary. This example
illustrates that the obligation inquiry should be interpreted broadly to
Hohfeld defines a duty as the correlative of a right and a liability as the correlative of a
power in the Hohfeldian system of legal relations; e.g., a duty owed by law or a liability
owed under a contract. See Commonwealth ex rel. Milk Marketing Bd. v. Ohio Cas. Ins.
Co., 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 371, 360 A.2d 788 (1976).
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 136, Illustration 3 (1932).
68.

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (1932).

69. 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 787, at 97.
70. 417 Pa. 408, 208 A.2d 267 (1965) (suit against surety who assumed the obligation
for loss and damage caused by subcontractor's failure to comply with the contract, the
subcontractor defaulted). See also Mechanical Insulation Co. v. J. Marcellus & Co., 36 Pa.
D. & C.2d 163 (C.P. Bucks 1964); Holly Constr. Co. v. Pottsgrove School Auth., 91 Montg.
199 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
71. See Brief for Appellant at 5-11. The issues and rules regarding creditor beneficiaries were clearly raised and Restatement § 133(l)(g) was cited as authority.
72. 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959). Visintine dealt with a contract between
the state of Ohio and two contractors. The court found the state owed the contractor a duty
to provide a site for him to work without hinderance or delay. See Brief for Appellant at 8,
Van Cor, Inc. v. American Cas. Co., 417 Pa. 408, 208 A.2d 267 (1965) (citing Visintine);
United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 305 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962); see Thomas G. Snavely Co.
v. Brown Constr. Co., 16 Ohio Misc. 50, 239 N.E.2d 759 (1968).

account for wide varieties of factual situations and diverse kinds of
obligations.
3. Reluctance of Pennsylvania Appellate Courts to Reconsider
Their Position.- The failure to distinguish between creditor and donee
beneficiaries has led not only to improper interpretations, but also to a
general reluctance on the part of the supreme court to raise the issue of
creditor beneficiaries. As noted in the previous section, the court avoided
expounding on the legal concepts raised in Van Cor by affirming per
curiam. 73 An even more explicit example of the court's reluctance to
decide creditor beneficiary cases is Brunswick Corp. v. Ciaffoni. 4 In
Brunswick two landlords promised to waive the privilege of distraint so
that the tenant could secure equipment necessary to run the leased bowling alley. The tenant defaulted and the supplier brought action to regain
the equipment because of the landlord's waiver.
The lower court held that the plaintiff was a creditor beneficiary
under section 133(1)(b) of the Restatement.75 It found that the promisee
tenant owed a duty to the plaintiff and that the performance of the release
by the landlords gave effect to the obligation. Also, both appellant 76 and
appellee" based the arguments in their briefs on the Restatement rules.
The supreme court, however, responded, "We find it unnecessary to
consider this third party creditor beneficiary theory by which the court en
banc resolved the case. Nor need we consider whether appellee's recovery can be justified on a donee beneficiary theory .... "78 In a one line
conclusive remark two concurring justices stated that the plaintiff "may
79
properly enforce [the waiver] as a third party donee beneficiary. ",
The Brunswick opinion explicitly shows the reluctance of the supreme court to forthrightly resolve cases involving creditor beneficiaries.8 Also the case illustrates the confused state of the law, since
the lower court and counsel directed their arguments to creditor beneficiary issues, and the two prominent concurring justices believed that the
73. See also Steets v. Sovereign Constr. Co., 413 Pa. 458, 198 A.2d 590 (1964), in
which the court affirmed per curiam the lower court's opinion denying recovery. But see
Steinert v. Galasso, 363 Pa. 393, 69 A.2d 841 (1949).
74. 432 Pa. 442, 248 A.2d 39 (1968).
75. 48 Wash. 40 (Pa. C.P. 1967).
76. See Brief for Appellee at 14-21, in which appellee argued the promisee owed a
duty to assure security.
77. See Brief for Appellant at"9-22, in which it was argued that no actual or supposed
duty was owed by the promisee to the third person. But see, Supplemental Brief for
Appellants, filed after the case had been argued, in response to the concern of Mr. Justice
Cohen on the authority of a referee in bankruptcy.
78. 432 Pa. 442, 446, 248 A.2d 39, 40 (1968) (the two judges writing for the majority
held that the bankruptcy proceedings were determinative of the issue).
79. Id. at 448, 248 A.2d at 41 (present Chief Justice Egan, joined by former Chief
Justice Jones).
80. See Demharter v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 412 Pa. 142, 194 A.2d 214 (1963)
(illustrating a similar reluctance to tackle the issue of creditor beneficiaries). See Brief for
Appellant Intervenors at 23-33, in which it is argued the promisor assured a duty of the
promisee to pay the various contractors.

beneficiary was a donee. Although Brunswick afforded the opportunity to
clarify the law of creditor beneficiaries, the court cleverly avoided the
opportune moment.
Even though the supreme court has provided little leadership in this
area, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the lower courts occasionally
allow creditor beneficiaries to recover. 81 While the superior court has
recognized that a creditor beneficiary can recover, unfortunately it too has
not articulated the distinction between donee and creditor beneficiaries.
Actually, the superior court in beneficiary cases rules by conclusion
rather than by reason. For example, in Clardy v. Barco Construction
Co. ,82 the court opined that the "[d]etermination of whether the third
party is in fact a creditor beneficiary depends on the intention of the
parties to the contract as expressed therein. We find that intention clearly
expressed in the agreements and by the conduct of the parties in executing
them.''83 This curt conclusion was the court's only explanation for its
decision. Absent from this conclusion is any reference to a duty owed by
the promisee and assumed by the promisor. 84 Nothing is said of the type
of intention that is needed nor is any definition of a creditor beneficiary
set forth. While conciseness in judicial opinion writing has its virtue, the
81. See, e.g., Clardy v. Barco Constr. Co., 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 208 A.2d 793
(1965); Hempt v. South Orange Trust Co., 63 Pa. D. & C. 559 (C.P. Dauph. 1948) (materialman's suit against promisor, who orally agreed with the owners to pay all creditors of the
construction company. The court cited as authority Liebman v. Fox, 96 Montg. 9 (Pa. C.P.
1972) (attorney sued for fees due him under separations agreement); Jackson Marine Sales,
Inc. v. Maurer, 59 Lanc. 503 (Pa. C.P. 1965) (promisor agreed to pay promisee's debt to
third party assignor; assignee sued as creditor beneficiary); Datesman v. Upper Darby Nat'l
Bank, 37 Del. 10 (Pa. C.P. 1948) (agreement between depositor and depository bank to apply
deposits solely to pay checks of a third party); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, Illustration 9 (1932); see Peters v. Burke, 19 Bucks 572 (Pa. C.P. 1970); Youth Center v. Ward &
Ward, Inc., 52 Luz. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1961) (plaintiff lessee was beneficiary to an agreement
between lessor shopping center and other lessee, which was designed to regulate competition; lessor also owed a contractual duty to the plaintiff); Samuels v. California Ins. Co., 20
Beaver 169 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Bostetter v. Hill, 11 Cumb. 88 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Bell v. Williams,
41 Pa. D. & C. 253 (C.P. Phila. 1941).
82. 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 208 A.2d 793 (1965) (general contractor held to be a
creditor beneficiary of a construction loan agreement, which the plaintiff had attached). But
see Demharter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 412 Pa. 142, 194 A.2d 214 (1963) (the facts
of these two cases were nearly identical). See Brief for Appellant at 7-8 in the Clardy case
arguing that Demharter was directly on point.
Another case illustrating the superior court's reluctance to explain its decisionmaking is
Kreimer v. Second Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 644, 176 A.2d 132 (1961), in
which a materialman sought to recover as a beneficiary under a contract executed between
the owner and a savings and loan association. A provision of the contract obligated the
association to directly pay those furnishing labor and materials. The court held the plaintiff
could recover as a third party beneficiary. It, however, avoided any attempt to label the
beneficiary as either a donee or creditor to explain its reasoning. While this factual situation
fits the classic definition of a creditor beneficiary (i.e., the owner owed a duty to pay, the
association assumed the duty), it was not so labeled. Oddly, in Kreimer the appellant argued
the materialman was a creditor beneficiary at the lower court proceeding and then in his
brief to the superior court argued on the donee theory instead. See Brief for Appellant at 611. See also Brief for Appellee at 8-12.
83. Id. at 223, 208 A.2d at 795-97 (citation omitted).
84. See Brief for Appellee at 8-10, in which appellee quotes from Restatement rule of
§ 133()(b) for creditor beneficiaries. The court, however, did not refer to this section in its
decision.

failure to provide more than mere conclusions has impeded the search for
clarity in the law of beneficiaries.
4. Federal Courts Recognize the Correct Application.-Even
though the Pennsylvania courts have not made the necessary inquiry in
creditor beneficiary cases, the federal courts, when interpreting the Pennsylvania law, have applied the Restatement rules and have done so
correctly. In Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc. ,85 the test used
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was whether the performance of the
contract would satisfy an actual, supposed, or asserted duty of the
promisee to the beneficiary and whether the promisor assumed the obligation. 86 The litigation entailed a contract between a licensee and assignee
that required the assignee to pay a royalty owed by the licensee to the
patent owner. The court found the duty inquiry was satisfied by the
licensee's obligation to make royalty payments to the owner. The assumption of this obligation by the assignee was then held to fulfill the
second leg of the inquiry. Ar-Tik exemplifies the proper application of
the test advocated in this comment and the merits of distinguishing
between donee and creditor beneficiaries. 87
Similarly, the court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jardel Co. 88
ascertained first whether the promisee owed a duty to the beneficiary and
whether the promisor assumed the obligation. In Sears the court found
the owner of a shopping center to be the creditor beneficiary of a contract
between the general contractor-promisee and the subcontractor-promisor. 9 The federal courts, as evidence by Ar-Tik and Sears, show an
ability to both understand the general principles and apply them with
adroitness and accuracy worthy of attention. Unlike the decisions mentioned earlier, they do not cloak their rulings with the indefinite "intent to
benefit" phraseology. Instead, by boldly stating and unequivocally applying the Restatement rules, they serve as a model the state courts
should emulate.
B.

Spires Rule Limitations

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also made recovery more
difficult for all third party beneficiaries with two unusual rules first set
85. 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962). See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1291,
204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953).
86. 302 F.2d at 504.
87. The court noted "it seems clear that Ar-Tik was a creditor beneficiary under the
law of Pennsylvania." Id. As explained under section 2 above, however, the Burke holding
was the exact opposite. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
88. 421 F.2d 1048 (3d Cir, 1970).
89. The contract between the parties explicitly contemplated the duty assumed by the
subcontractor to the owner. The creditor beneficiary did not prevail, however, as a general
release between the contracting parties was held to be binding on the owner. Id. at 1055-56.
For vesting of beneficiary rights, see Logan v. Glass, 136 Pa. Super. Ct. 221, 7 A.2d 116
(1939); Clardy v. Barco Constr. Co., 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 208 A.2d 793 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§§

142, 143 (1932).

forth in Spires v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co. 9 The "Spires Rule,"
which has been cited as the ruling law in both creditor and donee cases,
declares that,
To be a third party beneficiary entitled to recover on a contract it
is not enough that it be intended by one of the parties of the
contract and the third person that the latter should be a beneficiary, but both parties to the contract must so intend and must
indicate that intention in the contract;.

.

.The obligation to the

third party must be9 created, and must affirmatively appear in
the contract itself. '
The two elements of the rule that act as barriers are the "intent of both"
test and the "affirmatively appear" requirement. In the following discussion, each of these elements will be considered separately.
1. Intent of Both Rule.-This barrier to recovery requires that both
the promisee and promisor intend to confer a benefit upon the third party.
While the "intent to benefit" discussion showed the problems that
resulted from misapplying the standards for the promisee's intention, this
barrier focusses on the promisor's intention. The Pennsylvania courts
thus demand that the promisor intend to confer a benefit on the third
party. Again, this restrictive interpretation is unique to Pennsylvania. In
contrast, it is only the intent of the promisee who pays for the promise
that governs under the prevailing view. 92 The concept of mutual intent
generally plays no role in the analysis. In most instances the promisor's
motivation for entering into a contract is the consideration offered by the
promisee. Therefore, his intention should play no role in the determination of beneficiary rights. 93 Properly, the intention of the promisor should
be, and is, irrelevant to the question of whether beneficiary rights have
been created by contract.
Compounding the "intent to benefit" test, the "intent of both"
requirement regrettably attenuates the rights of beneficiaries even further. 94 Not only do the courts scrutinize the contract for an "intent to
benefit" on the part of the promisee, but they require it of the promisor as
well .95 As noted previously, the "intention" standard is not used to
90. 364 Pa. 52, 70 A.2d 828 (1950). But see 24 TEMPLE L. REV. 89 (1950-51), in which
the author states that the Spires rules are typical and in accordance with the Restatement.
91. Id. at 56-57, 70 A.2d at 830-31 (citations and footnotes omitted).
92. See Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954); McCulloch v.
Canadian Pac. Ry., 53 F. Supp. 534 (D. Minn. 1943); 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 776;
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932); 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 356A (3d ed. 1959);
accord, 17 U. PITr.L. REV. 483 (1956). 17 U. PITr.L. REV. 483 (1956).
93. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Jardel Co., 421 F.2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1970).
94. By using the intent of the promisor in the determination, the way is open for
outright denials of such intention when any ambiguity exists. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at
18-23, Hillbrook Apts., Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co., 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 565, 352 A.2d 148 (1975)
(appellee denied any intention to benefit a third party whose names was captioned on the

contract).
95. See notes 56-57 supra. The cases there cited were also based on the "intent of
both" standard. But see Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 370 Pa.
513, 88 A.2d 719 (1952).

denote merely that both parties contemplated the existence of a beneficiary as the Spires language might imply. If used in this manner it would
be consistent with the objective theory of contracts. Instead, the Pennsylvania courts construe intention to mean that the motive of both parties
was to confer a benefit with donative intent upon the third person. 96 The
consequences of such an interpretation are considerable, because in the
creditor beneficiary relationship it is not the motive of either party to
confer a benefit on the third party, and in the donee beneficiary situation
it is only the promisee who desires to confer such a benefit.
Although the requirement that both parties must intend to benefit
another is applied in creditor beneficiary cases, its impact as a denial of
rights is purely secondary. 97 That is, the creditor beneficiaries' rights
have already been completely denied by the improper use of the "intent
to benefit" test, and, thus, the "intent of both" rule is simply another
means to deny rights already lost by misapplication. The "intent to
benefit" test, even if applied only to the promisor, results in a denial of
third party creditor rights, since the promisor's sole intent is to benefit
himself with the promisee's consideration, not to benefit the beneficiary.
By requiring that the motive of both parties be to benefit the third person,
the supreme court has completely closed the door to creditor beneficiary
recovery. Actually, the Blymire doctrine, which denied recovery to
creditor beneficiaries, still rules, although now by implication through the
98
intention standards rather than by its direct language.
The requirement of the "intent of both" rule has a more profound
and direct effect in donee cases. A case that clearly delineates the
divergent rulings that result depending on whether the intent of the
promisee or the intent of both parties is used is Mowrer v. Poirier &
McLane Corp.99 Plaintiff sued on a construction contract with the Commonwealth that required the general contractor to procure insurance for
himself and any subcontractor for property damage resulting from the
performance of the contract. The plaintiff's property was damaged during
the performance of the contract, and he sought damages for breach of the
96. See, e.g., Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 414 Pa. 91, 199
A.2d 272 (1964); Silverman v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 407 Pa. 507, 180 A.2d 894 (1962);
Barnes v. Craft, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 731 (C.P. York 1961) (plaintiff-employee sued for wages
specified in contract between a school authority and the general contractor. The court held
that the plaintiff was not intended to be benefited by both parties). But see Youth Center v.
Ward & Ward, Inc., 52 Luz. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1961) (analysis based on purpose and intent of the
promisee).
97. See, e.g., Burke v. North Huntington Tp. Mun. Auth., 390 Pa. 588, 136 A.2d 310
(1957); Commonwealth, Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. Rapistan, Inc., 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501,
323 A.2d 410 (1974); see Josal, Inc. v. Rolling Park Homes, Inc., 195 Pa. Super. Ct. 646, 171
A.2d 830 (1961); Baush v. Francum, 25 Bucks 283 (Pa. C.P. 1974); Samuels v. California Ins.
Co., 20 Beaver 169 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
98. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
99. 382 Pa. 2, 114 A.2d 88 (1955) (the case was argued twice before the supreme court.
The court finally split four to three). See also Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 414 Pa. 91, 199 A.2d 272 (1964); see United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 305
F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962); Mowrer v. Poirier & McLand Corp., 46 Berks 269 (Pa. C.P. 1954)
(the lower court held the plaintiff was a donee beneficiary).

contractual provisions. In strictly applying the "Spires Rule," the court
held that the parties merely intended to benefit themselves and found no
desire to provide a benefit to injured third parties. The majority concluded, "It is, of course, true that the insurance provision in the agreement accrued to the benefit of the plaintiff, not, however, as a donee
beneficiary, .

.

. but merely as an incidental beneficiary .

.

.

.100

But the application of the "Spires Rule" in Mowrer was not
achieved without a strong dissent that pointed to the injustice of the rule.
The well reasoned dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Jones, former Chief
Justice of the supreme court, questions the validity of the "intent of
both" rule. The dissent states that the question should be resolved by
application of the general principles of law set forth in chapter six of the
Restatement of Contracts.'01
And, while it has been said that it is the intention of the parties
to the contract which must be sought [citing Spires], in reality,
it is the purpose of the promisee who extracts the promise for
the benefit of the third party that is controlling. The promisor
assents to the promisee's requirement in such regard only because it desires to secure the benefits accruing to it under the
contract. 102
If one regards the case from the perspective of only the promisee, the
dissent's conclusion is, of course, at odds with the majority. The purpose
of the promisee "was to make sure that no one should suffer any damage
through the execution of the public work by a private contractor and not
be compenstated therefore.
within the protected class .

.
.

.

. To say now that the plaintiff is not
is bluntly to disregard the plain intend."103 It is evident from the comparison

ment of the Commonwealth..
of the two positions that beneficiary rights will not be properly recognized
as long as the courts require that both parties intend to confer a benefit to
10 4
the beneficiary.
Fortunately, the barrier raised by the "intent of both" requirement
has not always been strictly applied in all the areas of third party
beneficiary law. 0 One situation in which the supreme court has awarded
the donee recovery is governmental contracts with contractors who expressly assume an obligation to pay for damages caused during perform-

100. Id. at 7, 114 A.2d at 90; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 135,
Illustration 9 (1973).
101. 382 Pa. 2, 10, 114 A.2d 88, 91.
102. Id. at 10-11, 114 A.2d at 91.
103. Id. at 11-12, 114 A.2d at 92.
104. See 17 U. PIrr. L. REV. 483 (1956).
105. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 129 (C.P. Phila.
1973) (members of the public held to be donee beneficiaries of a minimum price provision
even though the contract did not specify an intent by both contracting parties to benefit the
public). But see Potato City, Inc. v. Bartlett, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 725 (C.P. Dauph. 1968);
Manor Shopping Center Merchants Ass'n v. Everfast Fabrics, Inc., 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 401
(C.P. Lanc. 1964).

ance. 106 Certainly in this situation the contractor-promisor has no desire
to benefit the private citizens, but recovery is allowed despite the "intent
of both" rule. The importance of this tendency to overlook the "intent of
both" requirement rests in the possible reluctance of the court to extend
the rule into new areas and the desire to follow the Restatement instead.
In summary, as noted in the dissenting opinion in Mowrer, the
"intent of both" requirement conflicts with the basic principle that the
intent of the promisee controls. The "Spires Rule" is unjust in that a
beneficiary should be permitted to recover when the promisee alone
intends the third person to have the status of a beneficiary. The "Spires
Rule" states, "it is not enough that it be intended by one of the parties
• . . and the thirdperson that the latter should be a beneficiary." 10 7 But
it should be sufficient when the third person reasonably believes the
contract was made for his benefit. This is all that is required for the third
party to recovery under the prevailing view and the Restatement.
2. Affirmatively Appear Requirement.
(a) Unfairness of the rule. -The second element of the "Spires Rule"
requires that the obligation to the third person "affirmatively appear" in
the contract itself.' 0 8 This is in reality a unique, judicially created parole
evidence rule. In the parol evidence rule, however, some fault rests with
the party who neglected to secure his rights. But, under the "affirmatively appear" requirement the third parties' rights are made to depend on the
promisee's ability to contract. The fairness of the rule is questionable,
because beneficiary rights are dependent on the wording of a contract that
the beneficiary did not formulate. Instead, the third person should be
permitted to show by extrinsic evidence alone 1°9 that the contract created
a right to performance.
The unfairness of the rule is especially apparent when the promisee
specifically alleges that the contract was made for the benefit of a third
person. In Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Rapistan, Inc. 110 the
promisee argued that the agreement into which it entered with a general
contractor was clearly intended to benefit the operator of a finished
106. Keefer v. Lombardi, 376 Pa. 367, 102 A.2d 695 (1957). This factual situation is not
recognized as an exception to the rule, rather the "intent of both" requirement was just
overlooked. In Keefer this may have been because of the appellant's failure to argue the
issue. See Brief for Appellant. The court did follow RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145
(1932) argued by appellee. See Brief for Appellee at 5. Accord, Thompson v. Harry C. Erb,
Inc., 240 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1957). See also Townsend v. Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 453, 119 A.2d 227
(1956); Del Pizzo v. Middle W. Constr. Co., 146 Pa. Super. Ct. 345, 22 A.2d 79 (1941); Given
v. Township of Marple, 51 Del. 159 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
107. Spires v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 56, 70 A.2d 828, 830 (1950).
108. See note 91 and accompanying text supra;accord, Silverman v. Food Fair Stores,
Inc., 407 Pa. 507, 180 A.2d 894 (1962) (holding that a beneficiary cannot enforce a contract
unless both indicate that intention in the contract); Farmers Nat'l. Bank v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 414 Pa. 91, 199 A.2d 272 (1964).
109. See 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 776 (Supp. 1971).
110. 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 323 A.2d 410 (1974).

warehouse. The beneficiary brought action to enforce the contract, which
was then breached by the general contractor. Looking solely at the
express terms of the contract, the court concluded that "while it certainly
contemplates that [the] equipment would be operated by a third party, we
can find no clear indication that such third party was intended to have the
status of a creditor beneficiary."Il' The court, in total disregard of the
intention of the promisee, decided the case by going no further than the
express terms of the contract and thus strictly adhered to the "Spires
Rule."
The "Spires Rule" was originally a very narrow principle designed
for a specific set of facts and based on public policy considerations. In
Spires, the lease agreement between the parties required the lessee to
insure the building for the benefit of the lessor. The lessee in accordance
with the agreement insured the building and its contents. A fire occurred
and the lessee settled for the damages to the contents, but not for the
lessor's building which was explicitly described in the insurance policy.
When the lessee refused to file a claim for damages to the building, an
action was brought by the lessor on the insurance agreement made
pursuant to the lease. The court held that the lessor could not recover
"because, whatever incidental interest they may have had therein, and
even if, as between them and the lessee, they were meant to be a
beneficiary thereof, they are not referred to in the policy itself as an
intended beneficiary.""l 2 The rationale of the decision was that it would
deprive the insurance company of two fundamental rights-the privilege
to choose the person whom it was willing to insure and the right to deal
exclusively with the named insured for settlement purposes. Although the
decision was based on these policy elements it has not been -so limited.
The "affirmative appear" requirement is even more restrictive in
application than it appears at first reading. It requires that the identity of
the beneficiary be disclosed specifically in the contract. Although the
"Spires Rule" language only requires that the obligation "affirmatively
appear" in the contract,1 13 the building in the Spires case was expressly
insured. Thus, the obligation assumed by the promisor was present; what
114
was missing was the expressed identity of the beneficiary owner.
Arguably the history of the law in this state does not follow this view. In
111. Id. at 507, 323 A.2d at 414.
112. 364 Pa. 52, 56, 70 A.2d 828, 830 (1950) (emphasis in original). Contra, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 135, illustration 9 (1973); 2 WILLISTON, supra note 1, §
364A.
113. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
114. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Power Corp., 418 F. Supp.
435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (interpreting Spires as requiring the identity of the beneficiary to
expressly appear in the contract); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882
(1960) (requiring specific language in an agreement before giving the beneficiary a right to
enforce it); Bausch v. Francum, 25 Bucks 283 (Pa. C.P. 1974) (holding that the promisor's
unawareness of the beneficiary's identity gave the plaintiff only the status of an incidental
beneficiary); Supan v. Oriole Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 638 (C.P. Alleg.
1965).

Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co. 115 the court adopted
Restatement section 139, which provides, "It is not essential to the
creation of a right in a donee beneficiary or in a creditor beneficiary that
116
he be identified when a contract containing the promise is made."
Simply stated, this identity burden, if placed on a beneficiary, would
render recovery nearly impossible.
(b) A move away from the requirement.-The federal courts have not
followed the "Spires Rule" that requires the identity to "affirmatively
appear" in the contract when they have interpreted Pennsylvania law. In
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bank Building and Equipment Corp. of
America 17 the court found that a reference to an adjacent building in a
construction contract was sufficient to show a "clear intention to benefit
[the owner when his building] is the only adjacent building that could
possibly benefit ....
''118 "This principle is even extended to a third
party not specifically in contemplation of the parties, where a contract
creates a duty to inspect." ' 9 As in the "intent to benefit" area, the
federal courts proficiently apply the Restatement rules and grant recovery
more liberally.
Recently, the supreme court circumvented the "affirmatively appear" requirement in Line Lexington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Penn
Publishing Corp.120 On facts nearly indistinguishable from Spires, the
court permitted reformation of an insurance contract. 12 ' The court at115. 312 Pa. 183, 167 A. 793 (1933); accord, Frank v. Corace, Inc. v. West Pa. Disposal
Corp., 118 Pitts L.J. 246 (Pa. C.P. 1970); Manor Shopping Center Merchants Ass'n v.
Everfast Fabrics, Inc., 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 398 (C.P. Lanc. 1965); Hempt v. South Orange
Trust Co., 63 Pa. D. & C. 559 (C.P. Dauph. 1948).
116. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1932); see Herre v. Davies, 51 West. 91 (Pa.
C.P. 1968).
117. 300 F. Supp. 632 (W.D. Pa. 1968). But see American Elec. Power Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the court, interpreting Pennsylvania law, held that Spires required that the intent to confer a benefit affirmatively appear within the four corners of the contract. Even though the defendant admitted
on its answer that it knew the generator it furnished was intended for the plaintiff's use, the
court followed Spires and concluded that an explicit intention to confer a benefit must be
present. It also noted the more liberal and generally followed view that a beneficiary not
named in an insurance contract can be an intended beneficiary under New York law. Id. at
448.
118. 300 F. Supp. at 637. The building contract between the owner and general contractor contained the following provision: "Contractor . . . shall take precaution to guard
against movement or settlement of adjacent building . [and] be liable for any movement
or settlement and any damage or injury caused thereby ....
" Id. at 634. On the basis of
this language, the court held that the owner of the adjacent building was entitled to be
indemnified by the contractor because of the death of an employee. Contra Steets v.
Sovereign Const. Co., 413 Pa. 458, 198 A.2d 590 (1964) (per curiam).
119. 300 F. Supp. at 637. The Court cited Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168
A.2d 573 (1961) as authority. In Evans a contract to service an elevator gave rise to a tort
claim.
120. 451 Pa. 154, 301 A.2d 684 (1973). See Hillbrook Apts., Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co., 237
Pa. Super. Ct. 565, 352 A.2d 148 (1973) (interpreting the ramifications of the Line decision).
121. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra. In Line, the lessee of a building
procured fire insurance for the benefit of the owner of the structure. The insurance broker
designated the lessee as the insured party as was the case in Spires. Similarly, the insurers

tempted to distinguish the cases on the rationale that the insurance agent
had knowledge of the lessor's identity. Nevertheless, this assumption
could have also been inferred in Spires. Furthermore, the supreme court
apparently weakened the "affirmatively appear" requirement quoted in
Van Cor,' 2 2 upon which the lower court relied in stating, "This case
merely affirms the rule that, in order for one to be a third party benefi123
ciary, to a contract, the contracting party must have so intended.'
Thus, the court appears to be retreating from the rigid requirements of the
"Spires Rule" and moving closer to the better reasoned approach of the
Restatement.
Not only has the rule been circumvented recently, but it has also
been denounced in Judge Cercone's dissenting opinion in Hillbrook
Apartments, Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co. 124 The dissent referred to the Spires
"affirmatively appear" requirement and stated "strictly applied, that rule
seems not so much a statement of the law of third party beneficiaries, as
an exposition of an archaic view of the parole evidence rule. . . . If by
this is meant that the precise relationship of the third party beneficiary
must be literally prescribed by the contract, it is wholly out of tune with
the clear weight of authority. ' 1125 The majority opinion implied agreement with the dissent, but reluctantly noted, "Sympathetic as we may be
to the dissent's position, we are not free, as an intermediate appellate
court, to overrule the decisional law enunciated by the Supreme Court of
126
Pennsylvania."
The "Spires Rule" is a product of the early third party beneficiary
law, which searched for a new rationale to avoid Blymire by constructing
exceptions to the denial of third party rights. The direct promisee
rationale constituted one means to accomplish this objective. 1 27 Today
this direct promisee rationale is embodied in the "affirmatively appear"
requirement of Spires, which requires that the identity of the parties be
expressed in the contract. Sadly, the reasoning that was designed to
settled with the lessee after the occurrence of a fire. Also, as in Spires, the duty to secure
insurance was embodied in the lease.
122. Van Cor, Inc. v. American Cas. Co., 417 Pa. 408, 208 A.2d 267 (1965).
123. 451 Pa. 154, 161, 301 A.2d 684, 688 (1973).
124. 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 565, 352 A.2d 148 (1975) (a four to two decision, Judge Jacobs
joining in the dissent). Hollbrook, Inc. brought suit as assignee of a contract for the
installation of a concrete floor system that was allegedly improperly installed. The underlying contract was between the president of Hillbrook, Inc. and defendant and was captioned,
"Re: Hillbrook Inc." The majority held that the plaintiff was not a beneficiary, as the intent
to benefit did not affirmatively appear in the contract.
The dissent notes persuasively, "If under these circumstances, the intent to benefit
Hillbrook, Inc. did not affirmatively appear, it is difficult to conceive of an agreement in
which it would appear, except when the parties have chosen some talismanic form of words
creating the relationship." Id. at 581, 352 A.2d at 157. See Brief for Appellee at 18-23,
arguing that under Spires the right of a third party to enforce the contract must be clearly
intended by the promisor and that he had no such intent.
125. Id. at 579-80, 352 A.2d at 155-56.
126. Id. at 573, 352 A.2d at 152.
127. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.

promote beneficiary rights is now used to destroy them. Such restrictive
reasoning has no justification in third party beneficiary law.
IV.

Conclusion

Third party beneficiary law in Pennsylvania is presently confusing
and complex, but the task to make the law clear and less complex is not
insurmountable. Most importantly, the courts must be forthright in their
opinions so that one need no longer wonder what the law of beneficiaries
is in Pennsylvania. A decision must be clearly made whether the Restatement of Contracts or Blymire is the ruling law. If Blymire is not the law,
then it should finally be expressly overruled and the Restatement rules
adopted.
In applying the Restatement rule the courts must begin to recognize
the fundamental differences between the two protected kinds of beneficiaries. The "intent to benefit" test should be limited to donee cases
in which it is justified. In creditor beneficiary cases, the courts should
implement the two-step inquiry of the Restatement. The "Spires Rule,"
which was first based on public policy considerations and characteristics
peculiar to insurance law, should be strictly limited to that purpose. Since
the two elements of the "Spires Rule" serve no legitimate purpose, the
courts should follow the general rules as expressed by the dissents in
Mowrer and Hillbrook and overrule these restrictive doctrines. If these
simple steps are followed the courts will bring Pennsylvania in line with
the prevailing view and clear the law of the confusing doctrines that have
existed since Blymire was decided.

LARRY L. MILLER
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